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CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 
I. SUMMARY CRIMINAL CONTEMPT: DEFERENCE TO 
. THE TRIAL COURT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In a 1980 decision, In re Gustafson,1 the Ninth Circuit held 
that summary criminal contempt was justified only when the 
contemptuous conduct materially obstructed an ongoing pro-
ceeding. On rehearing,· a limited en bane panel repudiated the 
material obstruction requirement and substituted an abuse of 
discretion standard. Under the new standard, great deference 
will be accorded to the trial court judge.8 An independent review 
of the record will be undertaken only when "the record demon-
strates that the trial judge did not fully consider the relative ap-
propriateness of summary and plenary adjudication of 
contempt. "4 
B. BACKGROUND 
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a), a judge 
may summarily sentence and convict a person for contempt of 
court!! if the judge certifies hearing or seeing the contemptuous 
conduct in the actual presence of the court and signs a contempt 
order reciting the facts. Case law additionally requires an imme-
diate need for summary disposition.' 
1. 619 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were 
Ely, J. and Wright, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the original opinion, see 11 
GOLDEN GATB U.L. REv. 153 (1980). 
2. 650 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Farris, J., joined by Browning, Wright, Good-
win, Wallace and Sneed, J.J.; Bouchever, J., diBSenting, joined by Hug, Schroeder, 
Fletcher and Nonis, J.J.). 
3. Id. at 1023. 
4.Id. 
5. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) in pertinent part reads: "A court of the United States shall 
have the power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its 
authority, and none other as-(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near 
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice .... " 
6. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1974), Harris v. United States, 382 
U.S. 162 (1965). These cases are discussed briefly in text accompanying notes 14-19, 
109 
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The summary contempt power has been much criticized' 
because it deprives the alleged contemnor of normal due process 
rights. There is no notice requirement, no opportunity to be 
heard, no right to allocution, and no right to counsel. The judge 
assumes the role of prosecutor, judge and jury. Traditionally, 
this lack of procedural due process has been justified by (1) the 
need to maintain order in the courtroom,8 (2) the wastefulness of 
a second trial, since the court actually heard or saw the con-
temptuous conduct,9 and (3) the availability of appellate review 
to safeguard the contemnor's rights.lo 
C. DISCUSSION 
This section will examine the court's opinion in light of the 
three rationales listed above and adopted by the court. 
The Need to Maintain Order 
Recognizing that the summary contempt power can have an 
immediate coercive efi'ect,ll the majority concluded that the dis-
trict court judge "must have the ability to quickly and authori-
tatively act to halt incipient disorder."11 But the majority lim-
ited the application of the power to situations where a need for 
immediate action exists.18 This immediate need requirement de-
rives from the majority's reading of two Supreme Court cases: 
Harris v. United States l ' and United States v. Wilson. III In 
infra. 
7. See N. DORSEN & L.FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT (1973); Kulma, The Sum-
mary Contempt Power: A Critique and a New Perspective, 88 YALII: L.J. 39 (1978); Sed-
ler, The Summary Contempt Power and the Constitution: The View from Without and 
Within, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 34 (1976); Comment, Counsel and Contempt: A SUBsestion 
that the Summary Power be Eliminated, 18 DUQ. L. RBv. 289 (1980); Note, Taylor v. 
Hayes-A Case Study in the Use of Summary Contempt Aiainst an Attorney, 63 Ky. 
L.J. 945 (1975); Note, Attorneys and the Summary Contempt Sanction, 25 Ms. L. RRv. 
89 (1973); Note, Direct Criminal Contempt: An Analysis of Due ProceSB and JIJI'Y TrUll 
Rights, 11 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 77 (1975); Note, Summary Punishment for Contempt: 
A Suggestion that Due Process Requires Notice and Heari,., Before an Independent 
Tribunal, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 463 (1966). 
8. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303 (1888). 
9. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,534 (1925). 
10. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1952). 
11. 650 F.2d at 1021. 
12. Id. at 1023. 
13. ld. 
14. 382 U.S. 162 (1965). 
15. 421 U.S. 309 (1974). 
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both cases, witnesses refused to testify; the Harris witness 
before a grand jury, and the Wilson witness at trial. Although 
both witnesses were convicted summarily of contempt, the con-
viction in Harris was reversed while that in Wilson was upheld. 
In reconciling the two cases, the Wilson Court noted that a 
grand jury could easily move to other mattersl6 while a 42(b) 
contempt hearing was held, but "[iln an ongoing trial, with the 
judge, jurors, counsel, and witnesses all waiting, Rule 42(a) pro-
vides an appropriate remedial tool to discourage witnesses from 
contumacious refusals to comply with lawful orders essential to 
prevent a breakdown of the proceedings."17 
The majority interpreted this distinction to mean that im-
mediate need is a prerequisite to the exercise of summary con-
tempt power. Stressing this view, the Gustafson majority, quot-
ing Harris, stated that the summary contempt power is to be 
used only when there is "such an open, serious threat to orderly 
procedure that instant and summary punishment, as distin-
guished from due and deliberate procedures ... [is] neces-
sary."18 Yet, this language appears to be mere dictum in light of 
the court's holding in Gustafson. 
The record shows no need to coerce appropriate behavior 
through immediate punishment. Indeed, the trial court judge 
did not hold Gustafson in contempt at the time of the allegedly 
contemptuous conduct. II He acted after the conclusion of Gus-
tafson's part in the trial, when the jury had been excused for the 
day. The majority did not find this delay fatal to summary dis-
position and cited cases to support its position. Of these cases, 
one was decided before Harris and Wilson,lo while the othersU 
dealt with the separate issue of whether the judge can delay sen-
16. ld. at 318. 
17. ld. at 319. 
18. 650 F.2d at 1022 (quoting Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. at 165). 
19. ld. at 1018-19. Gustafson was an attorney for one of six co-defendants. During 
closing argument he spoke so quickly a tape recorder had to be U8ed, made improper 
appeals for juror sympathy despite warnings from the court, and accU8ed the prosecutor 
and the court of attempting to interfere with a vigoroU8 defense. 
20. MacInnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157, 160-61 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 
342 U.S. 953 (1952). The court did not require a need for immediate action as a pre-
quisite to exercise of the summary contempt power. 
21. Commonwealth of Pa. v. Local Union 542, 552 F.2d 498, 512-14 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977); Hallinan v. United States, 182 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. 
denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951). 
3
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tencing. These last two cases fail to support the majority's posi-
tion. The coercive power of summary contempt still exists if cit-
ing is immediate but sentencing is delayed. If both citing and 
sentencing are delayed, however, then no coercive effect remains. 
Having overcome the hurdle of the judge's delay, the major-
ity found summary disposition necessaryl'l because a 42(b) hear-
ing delay could further prejudice Gustafson's client, and because 
it was necessary to deter further contemptous conduct by Gus-
tafson or other counsel. Both arguments are extremely weak. 
First, 42(b) hearings are relatively short and one could easily 
have been scheduled to avoid prejudicing Gustafson's client. 
Second, Gustafson's part in the trial was completed and nothing 
indicated that co-counsel were contemplating similar conduct. 
Indeed, several moved for mistrials based on Gustafson's 
conduct. 
This weak reasoning can only be explained by the majority's 
interpreting Wilson as holding that an ongoing trial (as opposed 
to a grand jury proceeding) justifies immediate action. Several 
authorities agree with this interpretation.1II However, a more 
stringent reading of Wilson is appropriate. 
The Wilson court distinguished Harris, not on the basis of 
the trial Betting of the contemptuous conduct, but on the effect 
of the conduct. The court noted that summary contempt was ap-
propriate to prevent a "breakdown of the proceedings. "14 In 
Wilson, the key witness' refusal to testify would have caused a 
literal breakdown of the proceedings. 
Furthermore, the Wilson court stated: "Where time is not of 
the essence, however, the provisions of Rule 42(b) may be more 
appropriate to deal with contemptuous conduct."" This state-
ment implies that the appropriateness of applying Rule 42(a) or 
42(b) should depend on whether time is of the essence, and not 
22. 650 F.2d at 1023. 
23. Kuhns, supra note 7; Kuhns, Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power: New 
Roles for the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury, 73 MICH. L. Rav. 483 (1975); Note, United 
States v. Wilson: An Expansive Approach to the Power of the Federal Courts to Punish 
Contempts Under Rule 42(0) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 9 Sw. U.L. 
REV. 747 (1977). 
24. 421 U.S. at 319. 
25.Id. 
4
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the form of the proceedings. 
Wastefulness of a Second Trial 
The majority found that "[a]s contention begins to develop 
into disobedience or disorder, the trial court is in the best posi-
tion to judge whether there exists a need for immediate penal 
vindication."18 Accordingly, the majority gave "great defer-
ence"17 to the trial court judge, largely on the trial judge's un-
supported statement in the contempt order that he had "no al-
ternative but to summarily punish."as 
Whether such deference should be given is questionable. 
While it is true that the trial court judge may in some ways be in 
a better position to evaluate the contemptuous conduct, since 
the record does not reveal tone of voice, stance or attitude, it is 
also true that the trial court judge is quite likely to be emotion-
ally involved due to the contemnor's difficult behavior.1e Indeed, 
in extreme cases, if the contemnor can prove the judge became 
"personally embroiled," summary contempt is prohibited, and a 
42(b) hearing must proceed before a different judge.ao The fact 
that the trial court judge was so disturbed by the contemptous 
behavior that he held an individual in contempt, indicates some 
emotional involvement. "Great deference" should not be given 
in such circumstances. 
Appellate Review 
A fair review by an appellate court is particularly important 
for a summary contempt conviction because of the absence of 
due process protections at the trial level. Theoretically, a review 
by an appellate court will safeguard the alleged contemnor's 
right to a fair disposition. However, the standard, as delineated 
and applied in Gustafson, will safeguard an alleged contemnor 
from only the most flagrant abuses. Instead of automatically giv-
ing the contemnor an independent review of the record, the 
court defers to the trial judge unless "the record demonstrates 
26. 650 F.2d at 1023. 
27.Id. 
28. Id. at 1031. 
. 29. The judge's objectivity is especially in doubt in situations such as here where the 
alleged contemnor attacked the integrity of the court. 
30. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 17. (1954). 
5
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that the trial judge did not fully consider the relative appropri-
ateness of summary and plenary adjudication of contempt."11 
Since the facts here indicate that this standard can be met by a 
judge's conc1usionary statement in the contempt order that sum-
mary punishment is appropriate, it will be rare that a contemnor 
will be able to establish the lack of consideration necessary to 
earn an independent review.1I 
Nor can the alleged contemnor expect his rights to be safe-
guarded by a careful review of a detailed contempt order. Ap-
parently, an appellate court will accept a conc1usionary order 
and defer to the trial judge. The order here stated no fa~ts, 
other than the presence of other counsel, to justify the summary 
disposition. This does not support the use of the summary COD-
tempt power because Rule 42(a) requires that the contemptuous 
conduct occur in the presence of the court which makes almost 
certain the presence of other counsel. 
At the very. minimum, an alleged contemnor should be enti-
tled to a summary contempt order which states sufficient facts 
such that a conviction will not be affirmed merely on the basis of 
speculation by the reviewing court as to the reasons which might 
have supported a summary disposition." Such a standard is but 
one step from denying review altogether. It is bad enough to al-
low a person to be convicted without notice or hearing, but even 
worse to affirm that conviction based upon mere speculation. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The dissent delineated a much fairer standard-a clearly er-
roneous standard. First, under this standard, real substance 
would be given to the majority's concern that the summary con-
tempt power be limited to circumstances where there is "such an 
open, serious threat to orderly procedure that instant and sum-
mary punishment, as distinguished from due and deliberate pro-
cedures [is] necessary."M The dissent would require the trial 
31. 650 F.2d at 1023. 
32. The contemnor will probably have to show that the judge became 80 "personally 
embroiled" that his judgment was affected. 
33. The appellate court speculated that the statement by the trial judge that other 
counsel were present might have meant there was a need to deter further contemptous 
conduct by the other counsel. 
34. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. at 165, quoted in In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d at 
6
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judge to make specific findings of fact that the contemnor 
threatened further disruptions of the proceedings. Moreover, the 
trial judge would be obliged to give ufull consideration" to the 
necessity of summary disposition. Second, the trial court would 
be afforded sufficient deference-in light of its need to maintain 
order, and its superior position to observe the contemptous be-
havior-because the trial court's decision would be upheld un-
less clearly erroneous. Third, the contemnor's right to a fair dis-
position would be protected since the reviewing court would be 
Ucarefully scrutiniz[ing] the factual record for clear error."" 
Patricia A. Seitas 
II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT-NO DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY ABSENT AN INTENT TO PROVOKE A 
MISTRIAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Roberts, l the Ninth Circuit held that 
double jeopardy does not bar retrial when necessitated by 
prosecutorial misconduct unless the prosecutor intentionally 
provokes the mistrial. The defendants were convicted of at-
tempting to blow up a federal building in Arizona.' During clos-
ing argument at trial, the prosecutor made remarks intended to 
bolster the credibility of his key witness' with evidence outside 
the record. Specifically, the prosecutor called attention to the 
presence of a detective seated in the courtroom and suggested 
that he had monitored the veracity of the witness' testimony.· 
1022 (citation omitted). 
35. 650 F.2d at 1030. 
1. 640 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Skopil, J.; the other panel members were Poole, 
J. and Norris, J., dissent.ing). 
2. An earlier trial encied in a mistrial due to a hung jury. The double jeopardy clause 
has long been held not to bar retrial following a hung jury. See United States v. Perez, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). 
3. The witness was originally indicted with the defendants. He agreed to testify 
against the defendants in exchange for immuniiy from prosecution. United States v. 
Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 532 (9th Cir. 1980). 
4. Id. at 533. The pertinent portions of the interchange between the prosecutor, de-
fense counsel and the court went as follows: 
[Prosecutor]: Detective Sellers has been pointed out through-
7
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The prosecutor continued to reiterate this point even after the 
judge admonished him to stay with the record. II The court of ap-
peals reversed the convictions,' holding, inter alia, that the 
prosecutor's remarks constituted improper vouching which both 
harmed and prejudiced the defendants.7 After a retrial had been 
scheduled, the defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss their 
indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied 
this motion and the defendants appealed.' 
B. BACKGROUND 
The double jeopardy clause states that a person shall not be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense.' The 
language of this clause has proven to be "deceptively plain"lo 
and have created problems resulting from the balancing of two 
inherently competing interests: protection of society on the one 
hand, and protection of the rights of the accused on the other. 
The double jeopardy clause protects a number of distinct 
interests of a defendant. It serves to avoid the "embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal"ll of being retried, reduces the possibility 
Id. 
5.Id. 
out the trial as sitting in the courtroom during the telltimony, 
particularly of John Harvey Adamson. I would suggest to you 
that Detective Sellers is not here on vacation. He had a mis-
sion to serve and that mission was to sit and listen to the testi-
mony of John Harvey Adamson. 
[Defense Counsel): If the Court please, th"re is no evidence of 
this, and I don't know if Mr. Sellers is here on vacation or not. 
The Court: Yes, let's stay with the record. 
[Prosecutor): I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that he 
was here to listen to that testimony and make sure that-
[Defense Counsel): Object on the same grounds. It'll the same. 
It's not in evidence. 
[Prosecutor): If Adamson lied, ladies and gentlemen, the plea 
agreement is called off. 
6. Id. at 532. 
7. Id. at 534. The court found that U[t)he jury could naturally believe that [detec-
tive) Sellers had personal knowledge of relevant facts and was satisfied that these facta 
were accurately stated by [the witness) Adamson. In effect, the prosecutor was telling the 
jury that another witness could have been called to support Adamson's testimony." Id. 
8. 640 F.2d at 226. Denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is a 
"final decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) and thus immediately 
appealable. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
10. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32 (1978). 
11. In Justice Black's frequently quoted worda: 
8
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that an innocent defendant may be found guilty,!- and protects 
a defendant's right to have his confrontation resolved in a single 
trial. 13 Balanced against these interests are "society's interest in 
giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict 
those who have violated its laws"14 and "society's interest in the 
punishment of crime. "111 
(T)he State with all its resources and power should not be al-
lowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for 
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing 
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possi-
bility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). 
Justice Douglas suggested that the double jeopardy clause "is designed to help 
equalize the position of government and the individual, to discourage abusive use of the 
awesome power of society." Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 372 (1961) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
12. The double jeopardy protection is neceBBary because the prosecution's case be-
comes stronger through rehearsal and witneSBes become better at relating their stories 
and fending off cr0B8-examination. United States v. Green, 636 F.2d 925, 932 (4th Cir. 
1980) (Winter, J., diBBenting), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2005 (1981). See also Schulhofer, 
Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 449, 506 (1977): 
The government may be aided upon retrial merely by having 
observed defense counsel's tactics on cf0B8-examination or by 
having learned the nature of any substantive defense. The 
possibilities are particularly important because, despite recent 
trends toward the liberalization of discovery in criminal cases, 
the prosecution generally lacks the opportunity to learn much 
prior to trial about the defense tactics or the witnesses the ac-
cused will present. An aborted first tria1 therefore provides the 
prosecution with general insight into defense strategy that 
may be useful in preparing for retrial, an advantage frequently 
not offset in practice by the reciprocal revelation of prosecu-
tion strategy to the defense. 
(Footnotes omitted). 
13. Known as defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular 
tribunal," Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949), this right represents the defen-
dant's interest in getting the trial over with "once and for all." United States v. Jom, 400 
U.S. 470 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). However, the importance of this right may have 
been restricted by Dlinois v. Summerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), holding that this right 
sometimes is insufficient to overcome the public's interest in full and accurate prosecu-
tion, even if the state itself caused the defect in the initial proceeding. rd. at 463 (citing 
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. at 689). See Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of 
Double Jeopardy, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 81 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 
1978). 
14. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978). 
15. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 492 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The 
Supreme Court has stated: "It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every 
accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to consti-
tute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction." United States v. Tateo, 
377 U.S. 463, 466 (1963). 
9
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One of the troublesome issues of double jeopardy is under 
what circumstances a retrial will be permitted following a mis-
trial. ll Traditionally, courts have approached this question by 
distinguishing mistrials declared on the court's own initiative 
(sua sponte) from those declared upon the defendant's re-
quest.17 In the former instance, retrial will be allowed only where 
there was a "manifest necessity" for the mistrial, or where "the 
ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated."ls Although 
these phrases have received varying interpretations,lll they have 
generally prevented judges from abusing their discretion in de-
claring a mistrial without the defendant's consent. so 
A different issue is presented where the mistrial is re-
quested by the defendant. Unlike a court-declared mistrial, the 
defendant has not been deprived of his " 'valued right to have 
his trial completed by a particular tribunal' "11 because he has 
elected to relinquish this right. In addition, a defendant retains 
the option of continuing with his first jury with the chance of 
ending the trial with an acquittal.1I Therefore, as a general rule, 
a mistrial motion by the defendant removes any barrier to re-
prosecution, even if prosecutorial or judicial error necessitated 
the motion. II 
The one exception to this rule is when the defendant's mis-
trial request is attributable to judicial or prosecutorial over-
reaching. llf In this situation, the considerations underlying the 
16. Although Roberts involved a conviction reversed on appeal, this situation is 
analogous to that where a defendant has moved for a mistrial due to prejudicial miscon-
duct. See text accompanying notes 48-54 infra. 
17. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976). 
18. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). 
19. For example, manifest necessity exists when the judge declares a mistrial be-
cause of the possibility of prejudicial remarks by the prosecutor, Gori v. United States, 
367 U.S. 364 (1961), but has been held not to exist when the prosecutor asked for a 
mistrial because his key witness was missing, Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 
(1963), or when the judge declares a mistrial to insure that potential witnesses are prop-
erly advised of their right against self-incrimination, United States v. Jom, 400 U.S. 470 
(1971). More recently, retrial has been permitted when the judge declares a mistrial be-
cause the prosecutor's indictment was defective on the grounds that it would serve the 
ends of public justice. Illinois v. Summerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). 
20. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1971). 
21. Id. at 484 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)). 
22. 400 U.S. at 484. 
23.Id. 
24. The Jom Court carefully limited the general rule to "circumstances ... not 
10
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general rule are inapplicable because the defendant's opportu-
nity to end his trial with an acquittal has been prejudiced.1II In 
essence, a defense motion for mistrial necessitated by judicial or 
prosecutorial overreaching is not truly voluntary, but is instead 
the result of a "Hobson's choice" between giving up his first jury 
and continuing a trial tainted by judicial or prosecutorial 
misconduct.s, 
In United States v. Dinitz,I'7 the Supreme Court first at-
tempted to elucidate a standard by which to determine when 
overreaching would bar a retrial. Faced with an unusual set of 
facts,1I the Court advanced several possible standards without 
actually applying any particular one.s, As a result, lower courts 
attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching," id. at 485, and hinted that "where 
a defendant's mistrial motion is neceBBitated by judicial or prosecutorial impropriety 
design6li to avoid an acquittal, reprosecution might well be barred," id. n.12. The term 
"overreaching" has never actually been defined. In general, however, it denotes miscon· 
duct marked by willCulneBB and bad faith rather than prosecutorial or judicial error, or 
negligence. See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977). 
25. In United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976), the Court stated: 
[The defendant] may have little interest in completing the 
trial and obtaining a verdict from the first jury. The defendant 
may reasonably conclude that a continuation of the tainted 
proceeding would result in a conviction followed by a lengthy 
appeal and, if a reversal is secured, by a second prosecution. 
In such circumstances, a defendant's mistrial motion has 
objectives not unlike the interests served by the Double Jeop· 
ardy Clause-the avoidance of the anxiety, expense, and delay 
occasioned by multiple prosecutions. 
ld. at 608. 
26. ld. at 609. 
27. 424 U.S. 600 (1976). 
28. The defense attorney made an improper opening statement. On four occasions 
the judge reminded him of the purpose of the opening statement, but the attorney per· 
sisted in his improper remarks. The judge finally excluded the attorney from the trial 
and ordered him to leave the courthouse. The judge appointed another attorney to reo 
present the defendant who then moved for, and was granted, a mistrial in order to gain 
more time to properly conduct his defense. ld. at 601-05. 
It is difficult to draw a parallel between these facta and those of cases such as Rob-
erts. Unlike Roberts, the misconduct in Dinitz stemmed from the defendant's own attor· 
ney. While the steps taken by the judge were open to question, there is little doubt that 
the judge had in mind prejudicing the interests of the defendant when he took the ac· 
tion. Such conduct can hardly be compared to the type of prosecutorial misconduct in 
Roberts where the prosecutor deliberately attempted to prejudice the defendants' chance 
for acquittal. 
29. At one point, the Court suggested that the misconduct must be designed to ob-
tain a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant. At another point, the Court 
indicated that the misconduct must be intended to "goad the respondent into requesting 
a mistrial or to prejudice his prospects for an acquittal." And finally, the Court suggested 
11
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have applied Dinitz to support divergent standards under which 
retrial will be barred.80 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING 
The Majority Opinion 
In Roberts, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the prosecu-
tor's remarks appeared to have been intentional and to have 
prejudiced the defendants. II The court held, however, that 
double jeopardy does not bar retrial unless the prosecutor's com-
ments are "deliberately made to provoke a mistrial."11 Any con-
duct falling short of this standard, including gross negligence," 
is insufficient to bar retrial. I. In so holding, the court limited 
Dinitz to those cases where the prosecutor intends to provoke a 
mistrial. 811 The court reasoned that "the double jeopardy clause 
must be reserved for instances in which 'there has been an 
"abuse" of the trial process ... such as to outweigh society's 
interest in the punishment of crime.' ".e 
The Dissent 
Judge Norris, dissenting, criticized the court's distinction 
between prosecutorial overreaching intended to provoke a mis-
trial and overreaching intended to prejudice the defendant.17 
Dinitz, he argued, did not contemplate such a narrow protection 
of a defendant's double jeopardy interests. Rather, Dinitz 
should apply not only where the prosecutor goads the defendant 
into requesting a mistrial, but also where the misconduct inten-
that the misconduct must be "motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or 
prejudice the respondent." 1d. at 611. 
30. See United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1977) (retrial barred when 
prosecutor's conduct is undertaken to harass or prejudice the defendant); United States 
v. Nelson, 582 F.2d 1246 (1Oth Cir. 1978) (question is whether the conduct was the prod-
uct of a scheme intentionally calculated to trigger the declaration of a mistrial), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1079 (1979); Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1979) (retrial 
barred where the conduct is prejudicial and motivated by bad faith). 
31. 640 F.2d at 228. 
32.1d. 
33. Two circuits have adopted a gross negligence standard 81 a bar to retrial. See 
United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting United States v. Beas-
ley, 479 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924, reh. denied, 414 U.S. 1052 
(1973)); United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1977). 
34. 640 F.2d at 228. 
35.1d. 
36. 1d. (quoting United States v. Jom, 400 U.S. 470, 492 (1971)). 
37. 640 F.2d at 228 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
12
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tionally "'prejudicelsl his prospects for an acquittal.' ''88 
The dissent reasoned that the defendant's double jeopardy 
concerns are implicated in either instance. First, in both cases 
the prosecutor threatens defendant's " 'valued right. . . to have 
his trial completed by a particular tribunal.' "II Second, 
whatever the prosecutor's motive, the effect of such conduct is to 
enhance the possibility than an innocent defendant may be 
found guilty. 40 
Finally, the dissent contended that distinguishing between a 
prosecutor's intent to prejudice the defendant and the intent to 
provoke a mistrial is problematical at best. The two are "inextri-
cably intertwined" because "the intention to provoke a mistrial 
includes the intention to prejudice the defendant while the in-
tention to prejudice the defendant includes a willingness to risk 
a mistrial. "41 
The dissent concluded that given this difficulty of proving 
the prosecutor's actual intent, the likely result of the court's de-
cision will be that "courts will rarely find that prosecutorial 
overreaching was intended to provoke a mistrial because there 
will be insufficient evidence that the prosecutor did not 'merely' 
intend to prejudice the jury and so gain a guilty verdict. "41 
38. Id. at 229 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976» (emphasis 
in Dinitz). 
Justice Marshall, diBBenting to the denial of certiorari in Green v. United States, 101 
S. Ct. 2005 (1981), supported the diaaent'8 position, stating that the defendant's double 
jeopardy interest "is implicated whenever intentional governmental misconduct results 
in a mistrial." Id. at 2007. 
39. 640 F.2d at 229 (quoting Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963». 
40. 640 F.2d at 229. See note 12 supra. 
41. 640 F.2d at 229. 
42. Id. at 230. In his diBBent to the granting of certiorari in Green, Justice Marshall 
stated: 
I question the validity of the lower court's assumption that the 
Government in such cases tailors its misconduct to achieve 
one improper result as opposed to another. It is far more likely 
that in cases such as this, where the prosecution is concerned 
that the trial may result in an acquittal, that the government 
engages in misconduct with the general purpose of prejudicing 
the defendant. ... Moreover, even if such subtle differences 
in motivation do exist, I suspect that a defendant seeking to 
prevent a retrial will seldom be able to prove the Govern-
ment's actual motivation. 
101 S. Ct. at 2006-07 n.2. 
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A second issue presented in Roberts was whether retrial is 
permissible after a conviction is reversed on appeal due to 
prosecutorial misconduct. Although the majority did not address 
this issue, it implied by its reliance solely on mistrial cases that 
identical standards will be applied regardless of the procedural 
context involved. Noting that this issue has not yet been set-
tled,·8 the dissent recognized the possibility that a future court, 
given a case with similar procedural facts, could avoid the 
double jeopardy issue by declaring it inapplicable when a convic-
tion is reversed on appeal.·· 
The general rule is that reversal of a conviction on procedu-
ral grounds does not bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds.4a 
The dissent cited two recent Supreme Court cases which sug-
gested that prosecutorial misconduct falls under the purview of 
this rule.·' However, the dissent questioned whether the Court 
intended to include under this rule the type of bad faith 
prosecutorial overreaching outlined in Dinitz.·7 
43. 640 F.2d at 230. 
44. Id. at 230-31. The latest court to address this iBSue held that identical standards 
apply to either situation. United States v. Rios, 637 F.2d 728 (lOth Cir. 1980). 
45. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (l896). 
46. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (l978); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 
(1978). In Burks, the Court held that reversal due to insufficiency of the evidence pre-
vents a retrial. In distinguishing reversal on evidentiary grounds from reversal due to 
trial error, the Court reasoned: 
[Rleversal for trial error ... implies nothing with respect to 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather, it is a deter-
mination that a defendant has been convicted through a judi-
cial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, 
e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect in-
structions, or prosecutorial misconduct. When this occurs, the 
accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication 
of his guilt free from error, just as society maintaina a valid 
concern for insuring that the guilty are punished. 
Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
47. 640 F.2d at 230. See United States v. Opager, 616 F.2d 231, 236 n.13 (5th Cir. 
1980), where the court suggested that: 
While research has revealed no case directly distinguishing 
'misconduct' from 'bad faith prosecutorial overreaching', it 
seems clear that the latter phrase is the more demanding one 
. . . Misconduct, while it connotes some level of willful-· 
ness, does not require bad motive neceBSBrily. 
'Bad faith prosecutorial overreaching' allows no doubt, 
however, about the intent and purposefulness of the actor. 
14
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The dissent contended that traditional double jeopardy con-
cerns support the finding of an exception to the general rule 
where intentional prosecutorial overreaching is involved. Al-
though a conviction which is reversed does not prejudice defen-
dant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular 
tribunal," this right is not the only protection afforded by the 
double jeopardy clause." The dissent noted other double jeop-
ardy interests of a defendant implicated by retrial after reversal 
on appeal. First, intentional misconduct by the prosecutor in-
creases the likelihood of an erroneous conviction whenever a sec-
ond trial is needed.'" Second, the "expense, embarrassment, and 
ordeal" a defendant suffers by being subjected to an additional 
trial is equally present in either situation. For these reasons, the 
dissent opined that "it may be necessary to bar retrial after re-
versal for intentional prosecutorial misconduct to protect the de-
fendant's other double jeopardy concerns" and to deter such 
misconduct. 110 
The dissent drew further support from Burks v. United 
States, III where the Supreme Court held that double jeopardy 
barred defendant's retrial after the appellate court reversed the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion for an acquittal. III The 
Court reasoned that since no retrial would have occurred had 
the court properly granted the motion, to allow a retrial where 
the trial court incorrectly denied defendant's motion would be 
arbitrary.lla Applying this reasoning to mistrial motions caused 
by bad faith prosecutorial misconduct, the dissent argued that 
whether or not the trial court granted the defendant's meritori-
ous motion, the defendant should not be retried. &4 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
The unresolved question remaining after Roberts is: Under 
what factual circumstances will prosecutorial overreaching pre-
vent a retrial of a defendant? Roberts indicates that even in 
cases involving a high degree of prosecutorial abuse, double 
48. 616 F.2d at 235 n.11. 
49. See note 12 supra. 
50. 640 F.2d at 231. 
51. 437 U.S. 1 (1978). 
52. Id. at 18. 
53. Id. at 11. 
54. 640 F.2d at 230-31. 
15
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jeopardy may not bar retrial. III 
Under the Roberts standard, a defendant must, solely on 
the basis of the trial record, convince a reviewing court of the 
prosecutor's subjective intent to provoke a mistrial.1t While the 
trial record may even reveal malicious conduct, evidence of what 
the prosecutor was thinking will not be apparent.'T Thus, unless 
the prosecutor makes a statement that he intends to provoke a 
mistrial, the evidence a defendant can present will be circum-
stantial at best." In this regard, the best evidence a defendant 
can offer is to demonstrate the weakness of the prosecution's 
case, since the weaker the case, the stronger the inference that 
the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial. 
Roberts demonstrates well the difficulties in convincing a re-
viewing court of the requisite prosecutorial intent. First, there 
was strong evidence that the prosecutor acted intentionally to 
prejudice the defendants. As the record indicated, the prosecu-
tor continued his improper argument, even after being admon-
ished by the court to stop.,e The Ninth Circuit panel conceded 
that the prosecutor's remarks "appear to have been 
intentional. "80 
Second, there was strong evidence of the highly prejudicial 
55. For example, in United States v. Nelson, 582 F.2d 1246 (lOth Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied. 439 U.S. 1079 (1979), the prosecutor insinuated that the charges brought against 
the defendants were not brought against others because his main objective was to prose-
cute the "major Vaffickers." The judge struck this testimony calling it the most repre-
hensible he had ever heard. Because the defendants could not prove that this remark 
was designed to provoke a mistrial, the court permitted a retrial. 
56. In these circumstances, a reviewing court may yield to the findings of the trial 
judge unless those findings were "clearly erroneous." See Moroyoqui v. United States, 
570 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 997 (1978). However, in United 
States v. Medina-Herrera, 606 F.2d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 
(1980), the trial judge stated on record to the prosecutor: "I think you deliberately tried 
to prejudice the jury by bringing this out." The reviewing court found that this state-
ment alone did not show intent to provoke a mistrial motion. 1d. at 775. 
57. United States v. Green, 636 F.2d at 933. 
58. In Mitchell v. Smith, 633 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1980), it was not clear whether the 
prosecutor's conduct was intentional or inadvertent. After reviewing the record, the court 
concluded that given the ease with which the prosecutor impeached a witness' testimony 
at a second trial, it was "unlikely that the prosecutor would resort to bad faith efforts to 
impeach." 1d. at 1012. 
59. 640 F.2d at 226-27. See note 4 lupra for the dialogue between the prosecutor, 
defense counsel and court. 
60. 640 F.2d at 228. 
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nature of the prosecutor's comments. The witness had turned 
state's evidence. His testimony was the heart of the prosecu-
tion's case so that establishing the witness' credibility was essen-
tial to a conviction. 
Finally, in reversing the convictions, the court of appeals 
stated that the prosecutor had a weak case against the defen-
dants.'l That the defendants' first trial ended in a hung jury fur-
ther evidences the weakness of the prosecutor's case. 
These circumstances indicate that a very strong case of 
prosecutorial overreaching existed. It thus remains to be seen 
whether, under the Roberts standard, circumstantial evidence 
alone will ever be strong enough to bar retrial on double jeop-
ardy grounds. 
The future trend of double jeopardy cases, involving both 
issues of retrial following a mistrial and after reversal of a con-
viction, depends on the relative weight given to the competing 
interests that protect the defendant and society. From the de-
fendant's point of view, intentional prosecutorial overreaching, 
regardless of its underlying motivation, presents the clearest ex-
ample of the state abusing its superior resources against the ac-
cused.'1 From society's point of view, barring retrial on double 
jeopardy grounds necessarily precludes a determination as to the 
defendant's guilt or innocence. The Roberts court, however, has 
tipped the balance too far toward permitting retrials by adopt-
ing a standard that may effectively preclude successful double 
jeopardy challenges based on intentional prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
C. Elliot Kessler 
61. United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d at 535. 
62. The Supreme Court has said that the state's superior resources should not be 
used to make repeated attempts to convict the same individual. "The strictest scrutiny is 
appropriate when the basis for the mistrial . . . [is the belief) that the prosecutor is 
using the superior resources of the State to har888 or to achieve a tactical advantage over 
the accused." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 508 (1978). 
17
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III. THE SHIELD OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND THE 
JURY DELIBERATION CRITERIA FOR MANIFEST 
NECESSITY-A DE MINIMIS STANDARD OF APPEL-
LATE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States u. Cawley, 1 the Ninth Circuit applied the 
mistrial exception to the fifth amendment guarantee of freedom 
from double jeopardy in a capital case. The court's application 
continued shifts in policies and analyses which may increase the 
trial judge's authority to declare mistrials. 
On December 22, 1978, police arrested the defendant after 
they discovered heroin in his van. The defendant's first trial 
lasted two-and-one-half days. Mter three-and-one-half hours of 
jury deliberation, the jury foreman informed the judge that the 
jury could not agree. Without consulting counsel, questioning 
the jury or motivating the jury with an Allen charge,· the trial 
judge declared a mistrial sua sponte. The defendant failed to 
object to the declaration, was tried again and convicted. Follow-
ing this second trial, the defendant appealed contending, jnter 
alia, that the trial court's mistrial declaration subjected him to 
double jeopardy. 
B. BACKGROUND-THE MISTRIAL EXCEPTION 
A trial judge properly exercises his or her discretion to de-
clare a mistrial when a jury cannot reach a verdict. a H the judge 
declares a mistrial, the defendant may be subjected to a second 
trial before a new jury.4 
The mistrial exception to the fifth amendment's double 
jeopardy clause is well-founded.1I The fountainhead case is 
1. 630 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Farris, J.; the other panel members were 
Pregerson, J., and Skelton, S.J., sitting by designation). 
2. The Allen charge, initially approved in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 
(1896), is an instruction advising jurors to give deference to each other's views, and to 
listen with a disposition to be convinced of each other's argument. Its popularity as a 
motivational tool has been declining as it is sometimes deemed coercive. Sullivan v. 
United States, 414 F.2d 714, 716·17 (9th Cir. 1969). For a general discussion of the cur· 
rent trend in Allen charge use see annot., 44 A.L.R. Fed. 468 (1979). 
3. Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464 (1973). 
4. ld. at 462. 
5. ld. at 461·66. 
18
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United States u. Perez,' where the Supreme Court considered a 
classical mistrial' in which the defendant had not consented to 
the declaration. Writing for the Court, Justice Story found no 
legal bar to a new trial. Justice Story opined that in classical 
mistrials, courts have the discretion to discharge a jury from giv-
ing any verdict "whenever, in [the court's] opinion, taking all 
the circumstances into consideration, there is manifest necessity 
for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be de-
feated."8 Justice Story added, however, that the judge's discre-
tionary power should be used "with the greatest caution, under 
urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes. 'Ie· 
The discretionary power set forth by Justice Story allows 
the trial judge to balance society's interests in fair judgments 
and conserving judicial resources against a defendant's valued 
right to have his or her trial completed by a particular tribu-
nal.10 This "valued right" upholds the purposes of the fifth 
amendment double jeopardy clause to protect the defendant 
from continued embarrassment, anxiety, expense, and restric-
tions on his liberty.l1 Society's interests, on the other hand, are 
protected by the declaration of a mistrial when either manifest 
necessity for the discharge exists, or the ends of public justice 
would otherwise be defeated. 11 The principal example of mani-
fest necessity for a mistrial is the failure of the jury to agree.18 
Although the courts have repeatedly admonished against a pre-
cise test,14 they have consistently relied on several factors to de-
termine what constitutes manifest necessity. These factors in-
clude the probability that the jury can reach a verdict within a 
6. 22 U.s. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). Perez is the fountainhead case considering appel· 
late review of classical mistrials. lliinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. at 461. 
7. CI8B8ical mistrials result from the jury's failure to agree. Downum v. United 
States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963). 
8. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580 (emphasis added). 
9.Id. 
10. United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 
992 (1975) . 
. 11. E.g., United States v. Jom, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971). 
12. Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461 (1973) (quoting United States v. Perez, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 579 (1824»; Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1386 (9th Cir. 
1978). 
13. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963); Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 
F.2d 1377, 1386 (9th Cir. 1978). See United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); Forsberg v. United States, 351 F.2d 242 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966). 
14. E.g., Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1386 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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reasonable time/II length of time the jury has deliberated,.· 
length of the trial,17 complexity of the issues,l8 effects of exhaus-
tion or coercion on the jury,l' presence of an Allen charge,IO the 
jury's statement that it cannot agree,21 and the way this state-
ment is communicated to the judge. IS 
Although appellate courts often mention these criteria, they 
usually defer to the trial judge's discretion.sa In Cawley, two fac-
tors have special significance: the correlation between the length 
of the trial and the length of deliberation, and the trial judge's 
failure to question the jury. 
Correlation Between the Length of Trial and the Length of 
Deliberation 
In those rare instances where appellate review has found a 
declaration of mistrial an abuse of judicial discretion, courts 
have focused their attention on the objective factors of manifest 
necessity: length of trial, length of deliberation, source of the 
jury's statement, and presence of an Allen charge.u Some or all 
15. Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462 (1973); Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 
364, 368 (1960); United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 
U.S. 992 (1975). 





21. The most critical factor is the jury's own statement that it is unable to reach a 
verdict. United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.s. 992 
(1975). 
22. See notes 36-43 infra, and accompanying text for a discussion of the judge-jury 
communication factor. 
23. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509-10, 510 n.28 (1978). In United States 
v. See, 505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975), the court, after 
diligent research, found no case declaring that a mistrial was prematurely declared once 
the jury communicated to the district judge that it was deadlocked. Id. at 854. 
24. See, e.g., United States v. Gordy, 526 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1976) (no manifest ne-
cessity based on inconclusive communicatioll8 between the judge and jurors, and five-
and-one-half hours deliberation following a six-day trial); United States ex reI. Webb v. 
Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975) (no manifest necessity where the 
trial judge communicated only with the jury foreman, and the jury had deliberated for 
only six-and-one-half hours after a six-day trial. Retrial barred on double jeopardy 
grounds since this was defendant's second mistrial on the same charges); United States 
ex reI. RUBSO v. Superior Court of New Jersey, 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.) (no manifest necessity 
because of the lack of communication between judge and jury, and only 15 hours of jury 
deliberation following a nine-day trial), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973); United States 
v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1972) (mistrial declaration held an abuse of discre-
20
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of these factors are weighed in an ad hoc equation-i.e., the 
greater the length of trial, the greater should be the length of 
deliberation, with additional time required when the jury's 
statement is communicated only by the foreman.1Ii Qualitative 
factors, including the presence of an Allen charge, may also in-
fluence this equation. Ie 
The Arizona district court recently applied such an equation 
in Brown v. Hughes. 17 The Brown trial lasted twenty-two days, 
the jury deliberated two days, and the jury foreman conducted 
all communications to the judge.ls From these factors, the court 
of appeals found the mistrial declaration an abuse of judicial 
discretion.le 
The correlation between the length of trial and the duration 
of jury deliberation has been widely considered. Time for delib-
eration should be "long enough to warrant a conclusion that 
agreement is not fairly possible,"80 and that the jury had a 
"reasonble opportunity to deliberate."81 In United States v. 
See,81 the Ninth Circuit demonstrated the value of the trial/ 
deliberation correlation when it found ten hours of deliberation 
following a three-and-a-half day trial sufficient for a classical 
mistrial.8s In Arnold v. McCarthy,U the Ninth Circuit found 
twelve hours of deliberation sufficient for a short trial of ordi-
nary complexity. In both cases, the most critical factor was the 
jury's own statement that it could not agree." 
tion, considering the absence of any judge·jury communication and the jury's delibera-
tion of only 11 hours on a close question of credibility). 
Recently, the Tenth Circuit found no manifest necessity when it focused its inquiry 
on the lack of any recorded communication between the judge and jury after the judge 
had given an Allen charge. United States v. Hom, 583 F.2d 1124 (lOth Cir. 1978). 
25. See generally cases cited note 24 supra. 
26. See generally Rogers v. United States, 609 F.2d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir. 1979), 
where a three-and-a-half-day jury deliberation, which included an Allen charge, follow-
ing a three-and-a-half·day trial was sufficient even though the judge had not inquired 
directly of the jurors immediately prior to the mistrial declaration. 
27. 483 F. Supp. 793 (D. Ariz. 1980). 
28. 1d. at 795, 797. 
29. 1d. at 798. 
30. United States v. Hotz, 620 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1980). 
31. Nelson v. District Court, 543 F.2d 631, 632 (8th Cir. 1976). 
32. 505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975). 
33. 1d. at 852. 
34. 566 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978). 
35. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. See, 
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Judge-Jury Communication 
Trial judges question the jury to determine independently 
whether there is a reasonable prospect of the jury agreeing." 
Questioning can be done either through the jurors-individually 
or as a group-or through the jury foreman." The preferred ap-
proach is a poll of the jury." In addition to providing the judge 
with greater insight,S9 this method may also motivate the jury to 
reach a verdict.40 However, polling individual jurors is not re-
quired and, in this circuit, questioning the jury as a group is an 
acceptable alternative.41 
Cawley was the first time the Ninth Circuit reviewed a 
classical mistrial in which the jury was not questio~d. In 
Brown, the Arizona district court considered a mistrial where 
the judge questioned only the jury foreman. The court held that 
"one juror's opinion of a deadlock, even if it is the foreman's, is 
[not] a sufficient basis for the Court to conclude that the jury is 
deadlocked.u4s The Brown court, however, relied heavily on Ar-
nold and See, cases which do not support that holding. Both Ar-
nold and See support only the proposition that a poll of the jury 
is the preferred method.48 
C. DECISION AND RATIONALE OF THE COURT 
In Cawley, the Ninth Circuit panel reiterated the two Perez 
criteria for finding a mistrial: "A mistrial may be declared ... 
without violating the Fifth Amendment's provision against 
double jeopardy when 'there is either (1) "manifest necessity" 
[such as a jury deadlock] for the discharge of the original pro-
505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975). See also Rogen v. 
United States, 609 F.2d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir. 1979). 
36. ABA PROJECTS ON MINIMUM STANPARDS rOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRIAL BY JURY § 
5.4(c), at 156·57 (approved draft 1968) (hereinafter cited 88 ABA PROJECTS), cited with 
approval in United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 852 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 
U.S. 992 (1975). 
37. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978). 
38. "Merely questioning the jury foreman may not be 8ufficient." rd. at 1387. 
39. ABA PROJECTS, supra note 36, at § 5.4(c), at 156·57. 
40. Brown v. Hughes, 483 F. Supp. 793, 797 (D. Ariz. 1980). 
41. United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 
992 (1975). 
42. 483 F. Supp. at 796. 
43. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. See, 
505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975). 
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ceedings, or (2) "the ends of public justice" would otherwise be 
defeated.' "44 
The panel reviewed the relevant factors supporting the trial 
court's declaration. The panel endorsed great deference to the 
trial judge, reasoning that he was in the best position to assess 
the relevant factors: "the jury's collective opinion that it cannot 
agree, the length of the trial and complexity of the issues, the 
length of time the jury has deliberated, whether the defendant 
has made a timely objection to the mistrial, and the effects of 
exhaustion and coercion on the jury."411 
The court found the jury's oWn statement the most critical 
factor4' and that the statement must be followed by questioning 
the jury or jury foreman.47 If the judge is satisfied that the jury 
cannot agree, the judge may declare a mistrial without further 
questioning the jury.or consulting with counsel.48 
Mter briefly reviewing the length of the trial, the jury delib-
eration, the relatively simple nature of the issues, and the 
probability that the jury was not exhausted, the court shifted its 
focus to the defendant's failure to object, since a timely objec-
tion would have allowed the judge the opportunity to reconsider 
whether the jury had become vulnerable to coercion." Question-
ing the relatively short length of deliberation, the court mini-
mized the importance of the defendant's failure to object, and 
withdrew from the question of jury coercion. The court hypothe-
sized that "some factor in [the trial judge's] discussion with the 
jury foreman may have convinced the judge that further deliber-
ation would be futile."IIO Finally, the court implied that by virtue 
of the defendant's failure to object, the prosecution's burden 
shifted to the defendant to show that the mistrial declaration 
was an abuse of judicial discretion. III The Ninth Circuit found no 
44. 630 F.2d at 1348 (quoting Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir. 
1978». See also Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). 
45. 630 F.2d at 1348-49 (quoting Rogers v. United States, 609 F.2d 1315, 1317 (9th 
Cir. 1979». 
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abuse of judicial discretion. Manifest necessity was present, and 
the mistrial declaration was proper. OIl 
Judge Pregerson dissented. First, after reviewing the facts, 
he was unable to conclude that the trial court exercised the 
sound discretion required by Arizona v. Washington. all More-
over, he was "unable to say that 'manifest necessity' for the mis-
trial existed or that 'careful consideration [was accorded the de-
fendant's] interest in having the trial concluded in a single 
proceeding.' "M 
D. ANALYSIS 
Appellate review of cases involving the double jeopardy mis-
trial exception should consider all factors relevant to a finding of 
manifest necessity.aa Normally, consideration of subjective fac-
tors, such as the state of mind of the jury, will be left to the trial 
judge who is in the best position to observe them." Objective 
factors, however, lend themselves more readily to appellate 
review.a, 
In Cawley, two objective factors stand out. First, the trial 
court failed to poll the jury members as recommended by Ar-
nold and See.a8 The Ninth Circuit attempted to find support in 
Rogers v. United Statesae for the trial court's reliance on the 
questioning of the jury foreman alone.eo Rogers, however, merely 
illustrates an instance where the offsetting factors of lengthy 
jury deliberations and prior collective questioning made reliance 
52.ld. 
53. 434 U.S. 497,516 (1978). In Arizona, the Court considered a case where the tria1 
judge had, after much deliberation and after granting the defense and prosecution a full 
hearing, declared a mistrial pursuant to the defense counsel's airing of improper and 
highly prejudicial evidence before the jury. The Court held that the trial judge's deliber-
ation and hearing demonstrated that sound discretion had been elercised, and the mis-
trial declaration was in order. See also telt accompanying notes 8·10 supra. 
M. 630 F.2d at 1351 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516·17 (1978». 
55. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978). 
56. The complelity of the case and the amount of time required by the jury is best 
determined by the trial judge. Id. See also United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 
1069 (2d Cir. 1973). 
57. For a discussion of objective factors, see telt accompanying note 24 supra. 
58. For a discussion of the importance of polling the jury, see notes 36·43 supra and 
accompanying telt. 
59. 609 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1979). 
60. 630 F.2d at 1349. 
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on the responses of the jury foreman acceptable.s1 Consequently, 
even if the absence of jury questioning is not a per se judicial 
abuse, it certainly places a great burden on the other factors to 
support the judge's decision. In Cawley, the other factors do not 
support the trial judge's conclusion that the jury could not 
agree.ss 
Second, the court avoided analyzing the trial-deliberation 
correlation. The court attempted to excuse this analysis by al-
luding to a vague shift of the burden from the prosecution to the 
defendant." The court's authority for this shift, Arizona v. 
Washington,84 does not reasonably support this proposition.slI 
Clearly, the Cawley majority should have used a more thor-
ough analysis, as set forth by Judge Pregerson in his dissent, 
and considered the factors of the trial-deliberation correlation, 
the lack of direct questioning of the individual members of the 
jury, and the lack or' an Allen charge." 
Apparently, Cawley presents the only Ninth Circuit case 
upholding a declaration of mistrial after a jury deliberation of 
only three hours, regardless of the brevity of the trial. Admit-
tedly, the trial-deliberation correlation in the instant case is not 
dispositive, since both trial and deliberation were brief. How-
ever, the trial judge's aversion to an Allen charge, or any other 
form of jury motivation, more clearly shows the insufficiency of 
61. In Rogers, the jurors deliberated four days following a three-day trial. After they 
reported their inability to agree, the judge gave an Allen charge, and the jury resumed 
deliberation. One hour later, the jury sent a note via the foreman indicating that they 
were deadlocked and, without further inquiry, the judge declared a mistrial. The appel-
late court held that "under these circumstances there was no need for the judge to in-
quire further of the jurors" and there was manifest necessity to support a mistrial decla-
ration. 609 F.2d at 1317. 
62. See text accompanying note 2 supra. 
63. 630 F.2d at 1349. 
64. 434 U.S. 497 (1978). 
65. In Arizona, the Court considered a case where the defendant had objected to a 
mistrial declaration. The Court stated only that where the defendant had objected to the 
declaration, the burden of proof on judicial discretion lay with the government. The 
Court did not consider the burden of proof where the defendant fails to object. 434 U.S. 
at 505. The Cawley court failed to distinguish between a proposal by the judge for a 
mistrial declaration, where the defendant's consent is implied if he fails to object, and a 
sua sponte declaration, where he may have no opportunity to object. See United States 
v. Phillips, 431 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1970). 
66. 630 F.2d at 1351. 
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the majority's analysis.87 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's failure is crystallized by the fact 
that the trial judge found manifest necessity for a mistrial solely 
from questioning the jury foreman. Thus, the defendanfs right 
to conclude his trial before the first jury was subrogated, not to 
the public's interest in fair trials ending in just judgments, but 
to the lay powers of observation of a jury foreman. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In Cawley, the Ninth Circuit set a de minimis standard of 
appellate review of classical mistrials. This standard cannot be 
justified as conducive to fair trials or impartial jury verdicts. It 
can only act to subvert the defendant's right to conclude his 
trial before a particular tribunal. 
Steven Booska 
IV. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL-NO 
MASSIAH VIOLATION ABSENT A SHOWING OF 
PREJUDICE 
-A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Bagley,! the Ninth Circuit held that 
placing an informant in a defendant's cell alone does not war-
rant an automatic Massiah violation: The defendant must prove 
apparent prejudice before the court will recognize a violation. 
The defendant was indicted and charged with being a felon in 
possession of firearms, a felon in receipt of firearms, dealing in 
firearms and obstruction of justice.· Shortly thereafter, the gov-
ernment placed a paid informant in his cell. a One prosecutor tes-
tified that the government instructed the informant to obtain 
information concerning the firearm violation;' a second testified 
67. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. 
1. 641 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were 
Fletcher, J. and Jameson, D.J., sitting by designation). 
2. Id. at 1236-37. 
3. Brief for Appellant at 3. 
4.ld. 
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that the informant was to obtain evidence concerning unrelated 
homicides.' The informant testified at neither the pretrial evi-
dentiary hearing nor the trial.' 
The defendant argued that the use of an informant violated 
his constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit panel disagreed. 
This Note explores the alleged Massiah violation, and the signif-
icance of the court's decision not to recognize it as such. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Prior to 1964, a defendant awaiting trial could only raise 
fourteenth amendment due process challenges to police or 
prosecutorial overreaching.' In 1964, the Supreme Court in Mas-
siah v. United States,· excluded evidence police obtained in a 
surreptitious manner based on sixth amendment right to counsel 
grounds. The defendant in Massiah, already indicted, had made 
damaging admissions to a co-defendant and informant' while 
government agents listened through a radio transmitter.lO The 
defendant was convicted based upon the recorded admissions to 
the informant. 
On appeal, the Court held that absent the presence of de-
fendant's counsel any police attempt to elicit information 
through an informant violated the sixth amendment.ll The 
Court extended its holding to surreptitious interrogations as well 
as those conducted in a jailhouse. The Court reasoned that the 
Massiah interrogation occurred during a crucial stage of crimi-
nal proceedings, regardless of the location. II 
The import of Massiah lies in its current interpretation.1I 
The case was upstaged two years later by the landmark Miranda 
v. Arizona decision.14 In Miranda, the Court ignored defendant's 
5. Brief for Appellee at 8·10. 
6. 641 F.2d at 1239. 
7. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
8. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
9. Id. at 203. 
10. Id. at 201. 
11. Id. at 205·06. 
12.Id. 
13. See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is "Interroga' 
tion"? When Does It Matter?, GEO. L.J. I, 24 (1978). 
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under 
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sixth amendment rights during interrogation, and focused on 
fifth amendment protections against self-incrimination. 11 As a 
result, self-incrimination became the theory used to protect de-
fendants subject to interrogation. It was not until Brewer v. Wit-
liams,I8 however, that the Supreme Court rejuvenated the Mas-
siah sixth amendment approach. 
Police suspected Brewer of murder and transported him to 
another city after his indictment.'" During the ride, the police 
and defendant engaged in seemingly innocuous conversation,18 
causing the defendant to reveal to the police the location of the 
victim's body. Ie This evidence was used to convict him.IO The 
Court reversed, primarily because the police interrogated defen-
dant in the absence of his counsel:11 "[Tlhat the incriminating 
statements were elicited surreptitiously in Massiah, and other-
wise here, is constitutionally irrelevant. Rather, the clear rule of 
Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have commenced 
against the individual, he has a right to legal representation 
when the government interrogates him."11 
The importance of Brewer is twofold: It resurrected Mas-
siah into a working doctrine, and defined that doctrine so lower 
courts could apply its principles. IS The Court established a spe-
cific time-frame for sixth amendment violations during which 
the defendant has a right to counsel if interrogated." Second, it 
Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 645 (1967). 
15. The fifth amendment provides that "[nlo person shall be ... compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
16. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
17. Id. at 391-92. 
18. Id. at 393. During the ride, the interrogating officer addressed the defendant: 
"[S]ince we wiJI be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we 
could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled a 
Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas Eve 
and murdered." Id. at 392-93. 
19. Id. at 393. 
20. Id. at 391-92. 
2l. Id. at 397-98. 
22. Id. at 401. 
23. Brewer v. WiJliams, 430 U.S. at 401. "[O]nce adversary proceedings have com· 
menced against an individual, he has the right to legal representation when the govern· 
ment interrogates him. It thus requires no wooden or technical application of the Mas-
siah doctrine to conclude that [the defendant] was entitled to the assistance of counsel 
guaranteed to him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. (footnote omitted). 
24. 430 U.S. 388 (1977). 
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avoided applying Miranda.1a The notable absence of the once 
premier case for protecting defendants' rights illustrates the 
Court's intent to switch from a fifth to a sixth amendment ap-
proach.26 Furthermore, the disuse of Miranda conformed with 
the restrictions the Burger Court had imposed upon the initial 
gains made by defendants after Miranda." 
The Brewer Court recognized the need for the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel as a safeguard for a criminal defendant's 
rights28 and the fundamental purpose of the sixth amendment in 
insuring the fairness of trial and the integrity of the fact-finding 
process.29 Though the Brewer Court established no set require-
ment for a showing of prejudice, it adhered to the exclusionary 
principle that evidence obtained improperly will be excluded. ao 
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the subject of 
sixth amendment-informant cases in United States v. Henry.81 
In Henry, the Court endorsed the Brewer approach of protecting 
a defendant's rights during the critical stages of prosecution.1I 
The Henry Court also affirmed Massiah by stating that U[t]he 
Massiah holding rests squarely on interference with [defen-
dant's] right to counsel."88 
In Henry, the prosecution placed an informant in the defen-
dant's cell, with instructions to be a passive listener.af The in-
formant conducted a surreptitious interrogation for which he 
was compensated. all The Court held that U [b]y intentionally cre-
ating a situation likely to induce [defendant] to make incrimi-
25. The Court stated that "there is no need to review in this case the doctrine of 
Miranda II. Arizona." rd. at 397. 
26. See Kamisar, supra note 13, at 33·34. See also Saltzburg, Forward: The Flow 
and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 
GBO. L.J. 151, 208 (1980). 
27. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). In Mosley, the Supreme Court ruled 
that a defendant who has been issued Miranda warninga, but declines to discusa the 
crime, can be questioned again, after a significant time lapse and if a new set of Miranda 
warnings is issued. 
28. 430 U.S. at 398. 
29. rd. 
30. rd. at 406. But see Chief Justice Burger's dissent at 416·17. 
31. 447 U.S. 264 (1980). 
32. rd. at 270. 
33. rd. 
34. rd. at 266. 
35. rd. 
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nating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Govern-
ment violated [defendant's] Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. "18 
In effect, Henry affirmed both Massiah and Brewer: Once 
the right to counsel attaches, the sixth amendment protects a 
defendant in an interrogation where counsel is absent. Further-
more, Henry extended the sixth amendment approach beyond 
Brewer. In Brewer, the Court criticized police interrogations 
which deliberately elicit information in a surreptitious manner." 
In Henry, however, the Court expounded that the defendant 
need only prove that the police actions were "likely to induce 
the defendant to make incriminating statements."IS The Henry 
Court cited three important factors to determine whether a sixth 
amendment violation has occurred: (1) whether the government 
paid and instructed the informant, (2) whether the informant 
was a fellow inmate, and (3) whether the defendant was 
indicted.8I 
Justice Powell concurred and stated that he "could not join 
the Court's opinion if it held that the mere presence or inciden-
tal conversation of an informant in a jail cell would violate Mas-
siah.""o For him to find a sixth amendment violation, "defen-
dant must show that the government engaged in conduct that, 
considering all of the circumstances, is the functional equivalent 
of interrogation."41 The concurrence focused on the actions of 
the police, rather than those of the defendant and concluded 
that if the police deliberately attempt to elicit information from 
defendant in the absence of counsel, they violate the sixth 
amendment."· 
In United States v. Glover,48 the Ninth Circuit, in a case 
36. rd. at 274 (footnote omitted). 
37. 430 U.S. at 399-400. 
38. 447 U.S. at 274. 
39. "Each of these factors was important. The first established that government ac-
tion was involved. The second factor demonstrated that no knowing waiver had occurred 
and the third. that Henry was entitled to counsel." Cahill v. Rushen. 501 F. Supp. 1219. 
1225 (E.n. Cal. 1980). 
40. 447 U.S. at 277. 
41. [d. 
42. [d. 
43. 596 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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concerning improper interference by prosecutorial agents with 
the defendant's attorney-client relationship, held that because a 
federal agent obtained no incriminating evidence, the defendant 
suffered no prejudice and did not have an adequate sixth 
amendment claim.u In Glover, a federal agent interviewed the 
defendant without the permission of the defendant's attorney 
but obtained no evidence. The Glover court distinguished 
Brewer and Massiah by determining that the purpose of the in-
terview in Glover was to make an offer to the defendant to 
gather information in exchange for dismissal of some of the 
charges,4e whereas the government in both Brewer and Massiah 
intended to obtain incriminating evidence.·' The Glover court, 
in affirming defendant's conviction, stated that "had the inter-
viewing agents obtained any evidence that. could have been used 
against the defendant, this would be a different case."4'7 
More recently, in United States v. Irwin,·' the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated: "The right is only violated when the intrusion sub-
stantially prejudices the defendant. Prejudice can manifest itself 
several ways. It results when evidence gained through the inter-
ference is used against the defendant at trial. . . and from other 
actions designed to give the prosecution an unfair advantage at 
trial."·9 
In United States v. Kilrain,&O the Fifth Circuit required a 
showing of prejudice to exclude evidence. The defendant was in-
carcerated for various felony narcotic violations. &1 After indict-
ment and before trial, the defendant met with an informant and 
discussed his approaching trial. The defendant's attorney was 
not present. The Fifth Circuit recognized that although the de-
fendant's counsel was absent during the meeting, both Massiah 
and Brewer were distinguishable. The court found that the 
44. Id. at 864. 
45. Id. at 862. 
46.Id. 
47. Id. at 864. 
48. 612 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979). In Irwin, government agents petitioned defendant 
to continue to act as an informant while under new indictments. Defendant's counsel was 
not aware of the government's efforts. The district court found the government's actions 
improper, although they did not prejudice the defendant. 
49. Id. at 1187. 
50. 566 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1978). 
51. Id. at 981. 
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agent did not testify at the trial as to the content of the meeting, 
and that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the prosecu-
tion obtained any evidence through the meeting. The court rea-
soned that the defendant suffered no prejudice and therefore af-
firmed his conviction. III 
C. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In United States v. Bagley, the Ninth Circuit reviewed 
Massiah, Brewer and Henry before concluding that no Massiah 
violation had occurred.1I8 The court based its conclusion upon 
the requirements established by the previous Ninth Circuit 
cases. Glover established that the defendant must prove that he 
was prejudiced at trial by evidence obtained from defendant's 
interrogation conducted without the presence of defense coun-
sel. lI• The Bagley court observed that the informant in this case 
did not testify at trial and, indeed, "[the government] received 
no evidence from the informant that it did not already pos-
sess."1I1I The latter finding was further supported "by a compari-
son of the trial record and the record of probation revocation 
proceedings."" Applying these facts to the Glover test, the Bag-
ley court concluded that no Massiah violation had occurred. liT 
Next, the Bagley panel addressed whether the Supreme 
Court, in Henry,1I8 li~ited the Glover test to require a showing 
of prejudice at trial.III In concluding that the Court did not,eo the 
Bagley court found that the Supreme Court has never estab-
lished a rule that requires a showing of prejudice at trial.s• The 
Bagley court, however, assumed that the Supreme Court im-
pliedly intended that prejudice at trial be apparent to establish 
a Massiah violation." 
52. Id. at 982. 
53. 641 F.2d at 1239. 
54. 596 F.2d at 864. 
55. 641 F.2d at 1239. 
56. Id. The prosecution relied on testimony of several witneaaes who had tranaacted 
firearms deals with the defendant. The witnesses and their testimony remained the aame 
in both proceedings. 
57.Id. 
58. For a discussion of Henry, see text accompanying notes 31·42 supra. 
59. 641 F.2d at 1239. 
60.Id. 
61. Id. 
62. There is no language in Massiah, Brewer and Henry to support the Bagley 
court's assumption that the defendant must show prejudice at trial to establish a MOB-
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The court next dealt with the informant's unavailability to 
testify." Unavailability differs from not being called by the 
prosecution to tesify: If an informant is not called, it might ap-
pear that the testimony is not useful. Because the informant 
later became available, the Bagley court's refusal to remand84 
and allow his testimony seems contradictory. The court stead-
fastly required apparent prejudice,6a but denied the defendant 
the opportunity to prove he suffered prejudice through use of 
the informant's testimony. Although the informant was availa-
ble, the court denied the remand because it concluded that the 
informant's testimony would provide no additional infor-
mation." 
This conclusion tacitly reveals the Bagley court's position 
on jailhouse informant cases. In regard to the informant's un-
availability, the court believed it "reasonable to conclude that 
the informant's testimony could not affect the determination by 
the trial court that the government was in possession of all ma-
terial evidence against appellant before the informant ever pro-
posed to provide information. "67 The court was interested not in 
protecting the defendant from any sixth amendment violations, 
but rather in proving that the prosecution committed no 
wrong." The court failed to address the possibility that any tes-
timony by the informant could give a complete description of 
the transactions between himself and the defendant. The court 
declined to determine if any of these transactions prejudiced the 
defendant, even though this was the basis of his appeal.6' 
siah violation. Justice Powell's concurrence in Henry required that the governmental 
action be the functional equivalent to an interrogation for a sixth amendment violation. 
See text accompanying note 41 supra. 
63. 641 F.2d at 1239. 
64.ld. 
65. Id. at 1239-40. 
66. Id. at 1241. Judge Fletcher, dissenting in part and concurring in part, found the 
case was properly within guidelines established by Glover and that the majority had 
extended Glover too far. Id. at 1242. Judge Fletcher argu~ that a defendant faced with 
Massiah violations at trial should not have to prove apparent prejudice. In the case 
where no evidence is presented at trial, however, Judge Fletcher would support the idea 
that the defendant must prove prejudice. Id. 
67. rd. at 1240. 
68. Id. at 1239. 
69. rd. at 1237. 
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D. CRITIQUE 
The Bagley court could simply have rendered a narrow de-
cision upon the merits and affirmed the conviction. The court 
did decide against the defendant, but in the process attempted 
to reinterpret Supreme Court case law in sixth amendment right 
to counsel situations. 
The majority opinion begins by citing controlling passages 
from Massiah and Henry."o The court then cited with approval 
its own Glover decision and distinguished Henry.71 Unfortu-
nately, the two cases deal with different aspects of the sixth 
amendment right to counsel issue. A careful reading of this sec-
tion will show that the Henry-Glover comparison is ineffective. 
The Glover court concerned itself with government agents' in-
terference with the relationship between defendant and his 
counsel,72 In Henry, on the other hand, the Supreme Court ex-
amined a defendant's interrogation without his counsel 
present."s 
The Bagley court was still faced with its objective of insti-
tuting prejud~ce requirements in sixth amendment right to coun-
sel cases. With Henry summarily distinguished and dismissed, 
the Bagley court decided the case under the prejudice guidelines 
established in Glover. The Bagley court again grouped interfer-
ence with the attorney-client relationship with interrogation in 
the absence of counsel."4 
The Supreme Court has not made such a distinction, as evi-
denced by the different results in Weatherford v. Bursey" and 
the litany of Massiah, Brewer and Henry. In Weatherford, an 
agent interfered with the trial strategies of the defendant and 
his counsel,78 The Supreme Court established a prejudice re-
quirement in order to prove a sixth amendment violation."" .In 
Massiah, Brewer and Henry, no such requirement was ever 
70. Id. at 1238. 
71. Id. at 1239-40. 
72. See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra. 
73. 447 U.S. at 274. 
74. See 641 F.2d at 1238. 
75. 429 U.S. 545 (1977). 
76. Id. at 548. 
77. Id. at 558. 
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enunciated. Instead, the Court expanded the protections af-
forded defendants who are subjected to surreptitious interroga-
tion.78 In Henry, the burden of proof placed upon the defendant 
had been eased from showing that information was deliberately 
elicited79 to creating a situation "likely to induce" giving 
information.80 
In Bagley, all the evidence pointed to defendant's guilt. Yet, 
there was evidence of government misconduct. The Supreme 
Court unequivocably stated in Henry that when the government 
interrogates a prisoner after indictment, he or she is entitled to 
have a lawyer present.81 Consequently, the interrogation of the 
defendant in Bagley, in the absence of his counsel, should have 
called for a Henry analysis. 
In United States v. Sampol,8:J a case decided at about the 
same time as Bagley, the District of Columbia Circuit enunci-
ated three reasons in finding sixth amendment violations. In 
Sampol, a paid informant received a suspended sentence in ex-
change for information concerning the defendant obtained after 
indictment but'before trial. The informant provided no new evi-
dence but corroborated the prosecution's evidence and testified 
at trial.sa The Sampol court reasoned: (1) the situation satisfied 
the three part test of HenryjlU (2) the situation satisfied the "de-
liberately" elicited test of Brewerj8& (3) the fact that the inform-
ant's testimony was not used directly by the prosecution was ir-
relevant-the court could not conclude that the informant's 
testimony would have resulted in harmless error." 
E. EFFECT 
The short term effect of Bagley is justifiable. A convicted 
78. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra. 
79. E.g. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 399. 
SO. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274. 
81. [d. 
82. 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 19SO). 
83. [d. at 630. 
84. 447 U.S. at 270. See note 39 supra, and accompanying text. In Sampal, the gov-
ernment placed the informant in the defendant's cell, The defendant never waived his 
right to have his attorney present during interrogation. Finally, the defendant was enti-
tled to an attorney because the adversarial process had already commenced. 
85. 430 U.S. at 399. 
86. 636 F.2d at 638. 
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felon is returned to prison, and justice is served. The methods 
used to derive that result, however, are not justifiable. Looking 
beyond the specifics of this case, its effect upon the Ninth Cir-
cuit may be far reaching. By using Glover as a springboard, the 
Ninth Circuit established a new requirement for defendants sub-
jected to jailhouse interrogation. A defendant must now demon-
strate that he incurred prejudice, thereby drastically increasing 
defendant's burden of proof, contrary to the direction taken by 
the Supreme Court.87 If Bagley is followed, incarcerated prison-
ers will be subject to the strategies and ploys of prosecution 
teams and police who can seize the opportunity to gain unfair 
advantage. If the informant or agent does not testify at trial, the 
defendant will be hard pressed to show any prejudice. 
Mark F. Liscio· 
V. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW & 
PROCEDURE 
In other cases concerning criminal law and procedure, the 
Ninth Circuit validated a warrantless search of an automobile 
trunk as incident to a vehicle inspection, applied the Block-
burger "same elements" test to successive prosecutions, refuted 
an interlocutory appeal of a motion to dismiss an indictmeni for 
an alleged Speedy Trial Act violation, and denied a defendant's 
claims to two court-appointed attorneys where the prosecution 
was not for a capital offense. 
A. WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A PAPER BAG IS VALID IF INCIDENT 
TO A VEHICLE INSPECTION 
In United States v. Portillo, l the Ninth Circuit validated 
the warrantless search of a paper bag found in the trunk of a car 
because it was incident to a vehicle inspection.- Defendants Por-
tillo (the passenger) and Montellano (the driver) were stopped 
87. See Saltzburg, supra note 26, at 208. 
• Second year student, Pace University School of Law. 
1. 633 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Alarcon, J.; the other panel members were 
Sneed and Schroeder, J.J.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1764 (1981). 
2. Id. at 1315. 
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on the freeway by a deputy sheriff for various traffic violations. 
Prior to the stop, the deputy sheriff was informed that two 
known felons were driving in the area, and received a description 
of their vehicle. He also learned that other officers had observed 
the men placing a paper bag in the trunk of the car. 
After stopping the defendants, the officer opened the trunk 
to inspect a malfunctioning rear brake light. In examining the 
fixture, the officer supported his weight by placing a hand on top 
of a paper bag in the center of the spare tire hub. He felt a hard 
object in the bag, opened it and found a loaded revolver along 
with other items. The officer also opened a second paper bag in 
the trunk and found another loaded handgun. Based upon the 
evidence found in the trunk, the defendants were convicted of 
armed bank robbery.' 
Defendants challenged the constitutional propriety of the 
warrantless search. The Ninth Circuit, relying upon Rakas v. Il~ 
linois,· ruled that passenger Portillo had no standing to raise the 
alleged illegality of the search because he possessed no protect-
able expectation of privacy in the automobile. The court held 
that Montellano, on the other hand, possessed a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the vehicle because he had both permis-
sion to use the car and the keys to the ignition and trunk.' 
The Ninth Circuit panel found that California Vehicle Code 
section 28068 authorizes an officer to conduct a reasonable in-
spection of a vehicle to determine the nature and extent of a 
3. Defendants were found guilty of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2113 (Supp. III 1979). 
4. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In Rakas, the Court stated that, "a passenger qua passenger 
simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy [in particular areas 
of the automobile searched]." rd. at 149. In the instant case, Portillo did not assert a 
property or possessory interest in the automobile, or in the seized property. Conse-
quently, the court held he did not possess a protectable expectation of privacy. 633 F.2d 
at 1317. 
5. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
6. CAL. VEH. CODE § 2806 (West 1971) provides in pertinent part: 
Any regularly employed ... deputy sheriff having reason-
able cause to believe that any vehicle . . . is not equipped as 
required by this code or is in such unsafe condition as to en-
danger any persons, may require the driver to stop and submit 
the vehicle . . . to an inspection and such tests as may be ap-
propriate to determine the safety to persons and compliance 
with the code. 
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violation. The court noted that the reasonable cause necessary 
for an inspection under section 2806 differs from the probable 
cause requirement for non consensual searches in the criminal 
context.7 The court concluded that the malfunctioning taillight 
represented a threat to the safety of persons on the highway, 
warranting "an inspection more intrusive than the causal obser-
vation of the exterior of the vehicle."8 
The court also found the search of the paper bags constitu-
tional. Recounting the decision in United States v. Mackey,' the 
Ninth Circuit suggested that a paper bag deserves less than full 
fourth amendment protection.1o The court noted further that 
there is no expectation of privacy in containers whose contents 
are readily identifiable from their outward appearance. II Be-
cause the officer could identify the contents of the paper bag 
from an "outward feel," the court ruled that Montellano did not 
possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bags.1I In ad-
dition, the court asserted that exigent circumstances confronting 
the officer entitled him, for his own safety, to determine immedi-
ately whether the bags contained a loaded weapon. II Thus, the 
nature of the container, the officer's allegedly inadvertent touch-
ing of it pursuant to a vehicle safety inspection, and exigent cir-
cumstances, persuaded the court in this case that a warrantless 
search was justified. 14 
The Ninth Circuit's decision may be questioned on two 
7. See People v. May, 76 Cal. App. 3d 543, 143 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1977). 
8. 633 F.2d at 1319. 
9. 626 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1980). In Mackey, the court stated that "[a) paper bag is 
among the least private of containers. It is easily tom, it cannot be latched, and, to a 
greater extent than most containers, its contents can frequently be discerned merely by 
holding or feeling the container." Id. at 687. 
10. 633 F.2d at 1319·20. 
11. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981); Arkanl8l v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 
753 (1979). 
12. 633 F.2d at 1320. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. The court ruled, however, that the defendants were entitled to challenge on 
appeal the district court's ruling on the admissibility of prior convictions even thoup 
they did not take the stand.ld. at 1321. The court, therefore, extended to defendants the 
holding in United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
1034 (1980). The defendants were not held to the requirement of making the record 
contemplated in Rule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as articulated in Cook, be· 
cause that opinion had not been published at the time of defendant's trial. 633 F.2d at 
1321. 
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counts. First, the nature and scope of the vehicle safety inspec-
tion is particularly suspect here. This case is readily distinguish-
able from the reasonable inspection of a trunk conducted in 
People v. May,lO in which the car's mechanical condition was se-
riously in question. Ie The malfunctioning of one brake light does 
not ordinarily establish a serious condition, nor does it create a 
compelling need to inspect a closed or locked trunk. It is doubt-
ful, therefore, that the officer had reasonable cause to make any 
inspection of the trunk. 
Second, the Supreme Court recently ruled in Robbins u. 
Californian that closed containers found in the trunk of an au-
tomobile are protected by the fourth amendment against war-
rantless searches. Moreover, the court specifically declared that 
closed, opaque containers of any type may not be opened with-
out a warrant, unless "by its distinctive configuration, its trans-
parency or otherwise . . . its contents ate obvious to an 
observer."le 
The appearance, and not the "outward feel" of the 
container's contents, therefore, appears to be the crucial element 
in justifying a warrantless search. In light of Robbins, the Ninth 
Circuit's explication of the privacy interest in a paper bag or any 
closed, opaque container found in the trunk of an automobile 
will have to be re-evaluated. 
15. 76 Cal. App. 3d 543, 143 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1977). 
16. In May, the officer observed that the A-arm suspension had been cut. Based on 
prior experience, the deputy believed that the suspension system represented a 
dangerous fire hazard, and that equipment necessary for the system protruded into the 
trunk. rd. at 545, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 45-46. Furthermore, the officer in May had no prior 
knowledge tht the trunk might contain contraband. rd. 
17. 101 S. Ct. 2842 (1981). In Robbins, the Court stated: 
What one person may put into a suitcase, another may put 
into a paper bag .... [A)nd as the disparate results in the 
decided cases indicate, no court, no constable, no citizen, can 
sensibly be asked to distinguish the relative 'privacy interests' 
in a closed suitcase, briefcase, portfolio, dume bag, or box. 
rd. at 2846 (citations omitted). See also New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981), in 
which the Court outlined the constitutionality of a warrantl~ search of a closed 
container found in the passenger compartment of the automobile. 
18. 101 S. Ct. at 2847. 
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B. ANALYZING THE BREADTH OF THE Blockburger TEST 
In United States v. Brooklier,19 a Ninth Circuit panel held 
that the Blockburger "same elements" test determines whether 
double jeopardy bars post-conviction prosecutions. In 1974, the 
defendants pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy to extort money 
from a bookie.20 In 1979, they were indicted for the actual extor-
tion. U Defendants moved to dismiss the actual extortion charge 
on double jeopardy grounds because they had already been con-
victed of the conspiracy. 22 
In Illinois v. Vitale,'ls the Supreme Court extended the 
Blockburger same elements testl4 to post-conviction prosecu-
tions. Since defendants in Brooklier could have been prosecuted 
in 1974 on both charges under this test,11I the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that successive prosecution was likewise permissible. 
However, the court's reluctant holding noted the lack of clarity 
in this area of law. The Brooklier court explained why it might 
have reached a different result had it not deemed itself bound 
by Supreme Court precedent. 
The double jeopardy clause protects against both successive 
prosecutions and multiple punishment for the same offense.1e 
The court carefully pointed out that this case involved succes-
sive prosecution, not multiple punishment. The distinction is 
that the policies underlying the former protection are broader 
than those underlying the latter. Prosecution after conviction 
not only implicates a defendant's interest in not facing multiple 
19. 637 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Fletcher; the other panel members were Alar-
con and Canby, J.J.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1514 (1981). 
20. [d. at 621. Section 1962(d) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tion Act (RICO) makes conspiracy to extort money a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976). 
21..Section 1962(c) of RICO makes actual extortion a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c:) 
(1976). 
22. 637 F.2d at 621. 
23. 447 U.S. 410 (1980). 
24. The Blockburger test states that "where the same act or transaction constitutes 
a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied whether there are 
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the 
other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 
25. In Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975), the Supreme Court held that· 
under the Blockburger test a defendant can be charged in a single indictment with both 
conspiracy and the underlying substantive offense. 
26. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); United States v. Brooklier, 
637 F.2d at 621. 
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punishment, but also brings into play other policies, such as "as-
suring finality, sparing defendants the financial and psychologi-
cal burdens of repeated trials, preserving judicial resources, and 
preventing prosecutorial misuse of the indictment process. "8'1' 
Thus, the court suggested that had it not been for Vitale, it 
might have adopted the "same transaction" testae which requires 
all charges arising from the same transaction to be joined in a 
single prosecution. Ie 
The Brooklier court questioned the reasoning of other cir-
cuit court decisions, as well as two Ninth Circuit cases,ao which, 
under the authority of Brown v. Ohio,Sl extended the Block-
burger test to successive prosecutions. al In Brown, the Supreme 
Court held that double jeopardy barred indictment for a greater 
offense after conviction for a lesser included offense. aa The 
Brooklier court argued that Brown was inerely a logical exten-
tion of the Blockburger ban on multiple punishments. Since con-
current prosecution for both offenses was precluded under 
Blockburger, successive prosecution was likewise barred. There-
fore, the court reasoned that Brown did not clarify the standard 
to be applied to successive prosecutions. Sf 
However, in Vitale, the Supreme Court relied on Brown for 
the proposition that the Blockburger test applies in "determin-
ing whether two offenses are the same for purposes of barring 
successive prosecutions. "aa Although recognizing that Vitale 
"did not discuss the difficult questions raised by post-conviction 
prosecutions,"" the court nevertheless deemed itself bound to 
27. 637 F.2d at 622. 
28. This position was advocated in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187,200 (1959) 
(Brennan, J., concurring), and in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
29. 637 F.2d at 623-24. 
30. United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
1020 (1980); United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 
(1979). 
31. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
32. See Brown v. Alabama, 619 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Clark, 613 
F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); United States v. Brown, 604 
F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1979). 
33. 432 U.S. at 169. 
34. 637 F.2d at 623. 
35. 1d. at 624 (quoting Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416 (1980». 
36. 637 F.2d at 624. 
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"follow the Supreme Court's dictates however they are ex-
pressed."s7 Concluding, the court expressed its opinion that "[iJf 
the law of successive prosecutions is to be modified or clarified 
in this or some other more appropriate case, it will have to be by 
the Supreme Court and not by this panel."sB 
This decision is the unfortunate result of the Supreme 
Court's confused analysis in this area of double jeopardy. The 
Ninth Circuit panel deemed itself bound by Supreme Court in-
terpretation, but indicated in clear terms that it would rather 
have adopted the same transaction approach toward successive 
prosecutions. 
In Vitale, the Supreme Court failed to recognized that the 
double jeopardy ban on further prosecution for the same offense 
subsequent to conviction is distinct from that against multiple 
punishment for the same offense. This distinction is significant 
for policy reasons: Retrial is barred in the latter case because a 
defendant should not be punished twice for the same crime; re-
trial is barred in the former because a defendant should not 
have to face the burden of being prosecuted for an offense that 
could have been brought earlier. Perhaps because the term 
"same offense" appears in both contexts, courts have tended to 
confuse the two distinct protections by disregarding the separate 
underlying policies. Thus, courts have relied on Brown-a case 
conceptually limited to the multiple punishment context-as 
precedent for applying the Blockburger test to successive prose-
cutions. If the Blockburger test continues to be applied in the 
successive prosecution context, the protection against successive 
convictions will effectively be emasculated. 
The Blockburger test makes sense with respect to multiple 
punishment. By comparing the elements of the offenses to deter-
mine whether the proof requirements for one also satisfy those 
for the other, the possibility of double punishment for a single 
wrong is avoided. However, the Blockburger test is inappropri-
ate with respect to subsequent prosecutions. In this context, the 
concern is not only with multiple punishment, but also with the 
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under more favorable circumstances. By focusing merely on the 
nature of the offense, the inquiry is shifted away from the prose-
cutor's conduct, the burden of retrial on defendant, and the 
other policies underlying this double jeopardy protection. 
Brooklier aptly illustrates why applying the Blockburger 
test in this context fails to protect the double jeopardy policies 
involved. The prosecutor could have joined the two charges at 
defendant's trial in 1974. There was no possibility that proof of 
one charge would necessarily mean conviction of the other. 
Therefore, conviction on both charges would not have resulted 
in unfair multiple punishment. However, the prosecutor chose 
not to bring the second charge until 1979. To decide the case on 
the basis that the charges involved different elements avoids the 
real issue of w~ether the prosecutor was justified in waiting five 
years to bring the charge. 
The holding in Brooklier indicates that the Blockburger test 
will expand in the Ninth Circuit to include successive prosecu-
tions. The court explained that its position would remain un-
changed until the Supreme Court further clarifies this issue. As 
for now, Brooklier indicates that given changed circumstances, 
the Ninth Circuit stands ready to adopt the same transaction 
standard for evaluating successive prosecution double jeopardy 
claims. Consequently, the Brooklier court's reasoning will influ-
ence subsequent decisions. 
C. No RIGHT TO INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL OF AN ALLEGED VIOLA-
TION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT 
In United States v. Mehrmanesh,ae the Ninth Circuit found 
an interlocutory appeal of a motion to dismiss an indictment for 
an alleged Speedy Trial Act40 violation improper. The court rea-
soned that the appeal failed to meet the three-part test for in-
terlocutory appeals established in Abney v. United States.41 The 
Mermanesh court found that, under Abney, an order before final 
judgment may be appealed if: "(1) it completely disposes of the 
issue in question, (2) it is totally unrelated to the merits of the 
39. 652 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Canby, J.; the other panel members were 
Fletcher and Alarcon, J.J.). 
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161·3174 (1976). 
41. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). 
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case; and (3) the right asserted would be irreparably lost if the 
appeal were delayed until after final judgment."·s 
In applying Abney, the Ninth Circuit looked to United 
States v. MacDonald48 in which the Supreme Court denied an 
appeal of a constitutional speedy trial claim before final judg-
ment. The MacDonald court reasoned the claim failed all three 
parts of Abney since it would neither dispose of the issue com-
pletely nor be unrelated to the merits of the case because the 
constitutional claim requires a showing of prejudice which can-
not be measured accurately until after the trial. The 
Mehrmanesh panel was most impressed by the third 
point-that the speedy trial claim failed because the right to a 
speedy trial is offended by the delay before trial and not by the 
trial itself.·4 Thus, proceeding with a trial after a denial of a 
speedy trial would not compound the harm. 
The Mehrmanesh court found that the statutory speedy 
trial claim, unlike the constitutional claim, met the first two 
parts of Abney, since the statute requires no showing of 
prejudice, but that it failed the third part for the same reason 
that a constitutional speedy trial claim fails-the right may be 
vindicated on appeal after final judgment." 
The court noted that a petition for mandamus relief might 
be appropriate where clear error was present, for example, "an 
indisputable mathematical error or a truly egregious delay."" 
Mandamus relief was not appropriate here .even though other 
reasonable interpretations of the statutory language were possi-
ble, because the district court's interpretation was not unreason-
able, especially in light of the lack of precedent.·" Therefore, 
there was no clear error requiring mandamus relief. 
Judge Fletcher dissented. He believed the statutory speedy 
trial claim met all three parts of Abney. He found congressional 
concern that a nonspeedy trial might prejudice a defendant at 
42. 652 F.2d at 768. 
43. 435 U.S. 850 (1978). 
44. 652 F.2d at 769. 
45.Id. 
46. Id. at 770. 
47.Id. 
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trial, increase the defendant's anxiety, subject him or her to 
public hostility, result in the loss of liberty and strain the defen-
dant's financial resources.·' The dissent concluded: 
If denial of a Speedy Trial Act claim may only be 
reviewed on appeal from a conviction, then a rem-
edy is not available to those who are ultimately 
acquitted (but who nonetheless suffer all the dis-
advantages which concerned Congress), nor to 
those who, perhaps worn down by a lengthy pre-
trial delay, ultimately plead guilty.·' 
The dissent also believed that the majority misinterpreted 
the clear error standard in denying mandamus relief," reasoning 
that in the interpretation of new law where no discretion is in-
volved, the court of appeals should independently determine 
statutory meaning and thereby decide whether the district 
court's ~terpretation was clearly erroneous. 
D. No RIGHT TO Two COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEYS 
In United States v. Dufur/· l the Ninth Circuit held that in-
validation of the death penalty provisions of a federal murder 
statute eliminated a defendant's right to two court-appointed at-
torneys in a prosecution for ucapital crimes."111 The defendant 
was convicted of first-degree murder. Under federal law, persons 
indicted for ucapital crimes" are entitled to two attorneys.1I1 
However, since the death penalty provision of the federal mur-
der statutellt was rendered unconstitutional by Furman v. Geor-
gia,'" the district court concluded that first-degree murder under 
the statute did not constitute a ucapital crime."" The Ninth 
48. Id. at 772. 
49. Id. at 773. 
5O.Id. 
51. 648 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Farris, J.j the other panel members were Trask 
and Goodwin, J.J.). 
62. Id. at 515. The panel also held that there was no showing of prejudice from the 
cumulative effect of the district rourt's denial of motions concerning publicityj the dis· 
trict court's determination on the issue of waiver and voluntariness was supported by the 
record and not clearly erroneoUSj the indictment was sufficiently specificj and nothing in 
the prosecutor's closing argument warranted a mistrial. Id. at 513·14. This SUDlmary, 
however, is limited to a discUBBion of defendant's right to two attorneys. 
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1976). 
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976). 
55. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
56. 648 F.2d at 514. 
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Circuit affirmed.67 The issue was not previously addressed in the 
Ninth Circuit, although other circuits have settled the ques-
tion.68 The court agreed with the analysis and reasoning of the 
other circuits.69 The panel explained: "Since the statute's pur-
pose, in our opinion, derives from the severity of the punishment 
rather than the nature of the offense, the elimination of the 
death penalty eliminates Dufur's right [under section 3005]80 to 
a second court-appointed attorney,'''1 
57. Id. at 515. 
58. See United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
852 (1978); United States v. Weddell, 567 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Watson, 496 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1973). In Shepherd, the Seventh Circuit stated that the 
purpose of the two-attorney right is "to reduce the chance that an innocent defendant 
would be put to death because of inadvertance or errors in judgment of his counsel." 576 
F.2d at 729. In Weddell, the Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion. 567 F.2d at 
770. In Watson, the court upheld defendants' right to two attorneys even though the 
death penalty was invalid. 496 F.2d at 1129. 
59. 648 F.2d at 514-15. 
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1976). 
61. 648 F.2d at 515. 
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